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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SEARCH AND SEIZURE - 19 
tJ.S.C. § 1581(a) - RANDOM AND SUSPICIONLESS BOARD-
ING OF VESSEL BY CUSTOMS OFFICERS DOES NOT VIO-
LATE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S PROHIBITION AGAINST 
UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE. United States v. Vil-
lamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983). 
A customs officer boarded a foreign vesse11ocated in United States 
territorial waters to check the vessel's documentation. While on board, 
the officer detected the odor of burning marijuana and his subsequent 
search resulted in the seizure of approximately 5,800 pounds of mari-
juana. Defendants were convicted in federal district court of importing 
and possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute. 1 On appeal, the 
defendants argued that the district court erred in denying defendants' 
motion to supress the marijuana as illegally seized evidence.2 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed, found the 
seizure to be illegal, and held that the random stop of a vessel near the 
United States border could not be justified as a border search.3 Cus-
toms officers therefore must reasonably suspect a violation of law in 
order to stop and board a vessel.4 The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari5 and reversed, holding that the fourth amendment's prohibition 
against unreasonable search and seizure6 is not violated when customs 
officers, acting without any suspicion of wrongdoing, board a vessel for 
I. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 652 F.2d 481,482 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 
S. Ct. 2573 (1983). The United States District Court for the Western District of 
Louisiana convicted respondents of violating 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) ( 1982) (importa-
tion of marijuana), 21 U.S.C. § 84l(a)(l) (1982) (possession of marijuana with 
intent to distribute), 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1982) (conspiracy to possess marijuana with 
intent to distribute), and 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1982) (conspiracy to import marijuana). 
2. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 652 F.2d 481, 484 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 
S. Ct. 2573 (1983). On appeal, the defendants argued three other points of error 
which are not relevant to this discussion. See id. at 484-88. 
3. /d. at 486. The court noted that the defendants' vessel was first sighted and 
boarded 21 miles inside the border. /d. The term "border search" refers to 
searches and seizures at the national border and such border searches do not re-
quire reasonable suspicion of illegality. C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
§ 12.02 (1980). Therefore, the Vil/amonte-Marquez court considered the case as 
one involving a stop near the border rather than a "border search." 
4. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 652 F.2d 481, 486-87 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 
103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983). 
5. 457 u.s. 1104 (1982). 
6. The fourth amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
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the purpose of inspecting the vessel's registration documents.7 
Prior to determining whether a search or seizure is reasonable and 
therefore constitutionally permissible, a fourth amendment interest 
must be implicated. Case law has established that two elements must 
exist before the fourth amendment is applicable: (1) the person 
searched must possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in the item 
searched or seized and (2) the search or seizure must involve govern-
mental action. 8 
In assessing what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
the Supreme Court has recognized two factors as determinative.9 In 
Katz v. United States, 10 the Court addressed the issue of whether police 
recordings of a suspect's telephone conversation violated the fourth 
amendment. 11 The Court concluded that an individual has a reason-
able expectation of privacy while using a telephone booth. 12 Hence, 
the police violated the suspect's expectation of privacy by recording the 
conversation, and their conduct therefore constituted an unreasonable 
search and seizure. 13 The concurring opinion stated that the reasona-
bleness of an individual's expectation of privacy is determined by eval-
uating two factors: whether an individual manifests an actual 
subjective expectation of privacy and whether the expectation is one 
that society recognizes as reasonable. 14 
The fourth amendment affords protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures by requiring that search warrants be issued only 
upon a showing of probable cause. 15 There are, however, six judicially 
created exceptions to the warrant requirement. 16 There is a two-fold 
7. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573, 2575 (1983). Section 
158l(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 provides: 
Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any 
vessel or vehicle at any place in the United States or within the customs 
waters or, as he may be authorized, within a customs-enforcement area 
established under the Anti-Smuggling Act [19 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1711 
(1982)], or at any other authorized place, without as well as within his 
district, and examine the manifest and other documents and papers and 
examine, inspect, and search the vessel or vehicle and every part thereof 
and any person, trunk, package, or cargo on board and to this end may 
hail and stop such vessel or vehicle, and use all necessary force to com-
pel compliance. 
19 U.S.C. § 158l(a) (1982). 
8. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
361 (1967). 
9. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
10. 389 u.s. 347 (1967). 
II. Id. at 348-50, 352-53. 
12. Id. at 353. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
15. See supra note 6. 
16. The Supreme Court has established six exceptions to the warrant requirement: (1) 
searches incident to lawful arrest. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 
(1969); (2) the automobile exception. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 
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rationale for permitting exceptions to the warrant requirement. First, 
in situations where probable cause is present, exigent circumstances 
often make it impracticable to first obtain a warrant. 17 Second, certain 
stops18 and searches impose a minimal degree of personal intrusion, 
and therefore, police may act with less than probable cause. 19 One type 
of stop viewed by the courts as involving a lesser degree of intrusion is 
the investigatory stop.20 
The investigatory stop exception21 was established by the Supreme 
Court in Terry v. Ohio.22 In Terry, a police officer observed the defend-
ant repeatedly peer into a store window. 23 The Court held that the 
police could stop an individual for brief questioning and a pat-down 
search for weapons without first obtaining a warrant.24 The Court rea-
soned that police need only have an articulable suspicion of wrongdo-
ing because investigatory stops involve a minimal degree of intrusion 
and are necessary to protect the public.25 Probable cause, therefore, 
was not required for an investigatory stop.26 
The Terry doctrine has been expanded to permit investigatory 
149-50 (1925); (3) hot pursuit and other emergency searches. See McDonald v. 
United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454-56 (1948); (4) consent searches. See Davis v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946); (5) stop and frisk searches. See Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-27 (1967); (6) plain view searches. SeeKer v. California, 
374 u.s. 23, 42-43 (1963). 
Administrative inspections generally require a warrant but the warrant may 
be issued upon a showing of less than probable cause. See Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-39 (1967) (housing inspector may search premises only 
with a search warrant, but warrant may be issued upon less than probable cause). 
Warrantless administrative searches are justified when there is an urgent govern-
mental interest. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972) (no war-
rant or suspicion of wrongdoing is required to seize unlicensed firearms from a 
weapons dealer). 
17. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973) (warrantless search of premises is per-
mitted when evidence is in the process of being destroyed). 
18. Any stop, no matter how brief, that restrains an individual's freedom constitutes a 
seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 
16 (1967). 
19. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 879-80 (1975) (police only need to 
have an articulable suspicion that a vehicle contains illegal aliens in order to stop 
the vehicle and ask a brief question or two concerning the occupants' right to be in 
the United States). 
20. To stop a person engaged in suspicious behavior for brief questioning is a mini-
mal intrusion and therefore no warrant is required. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. l, 20-
27 (1967). 
21. This exception is traditionally known as the stop and frisk exception; however, the 
stop and frisk exception has been expanded to permit many types of investigatory 
stops. See C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 3, § 9.03; see also infra note 27 (stops of 
automobiles near the border). 
22. 392 u.s. 1 (1967). 
23. ld. at 5-6. 
24. Jd. at 25-27. 
25. Jd. at 20-27. 
26. Jd. at 27. 
1984) United States v. Pil/amonte-Marquez 163 
stops of automobiles near the border?7 In United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce,28 the Supreme Court determined whether probable cause was 
necessary before a roving border patrol could stop motorists inside the 
border while searching for illegal aliens.29 The Court analogized the 
minimal intrusion involved in these stops to the investigatory stop per-
mitted in Terry, and held that an articulable suspicion that a vehicle 
contained illegal aliens was necessary to justify these brief automobile 
stops.30 
The articulable suspicion standard, however, is not required when 
motorists are stopped at fixed checkpoints for purposes of determining 
their residence status. 31 A checkpoint stop of this type, which does not 
involve a search, results in a slight intrusion upon the motorist's fourth 
amendment interests.32 Although the fourth amendment is implicated, 
the government has satisfied the fourth amendment's requirement of 
reasonableness because every motorist is stopped and not taken by 
surprise. 33 
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez34 was the first case in which 
the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether customs officers, act-
ing without any suspicion of wrongdoing, could randomly stop and 
board a vessel to inspect the vessel's documents?5 The Court reasoned 
that fixed checkpoints were not a viable alternative to random vessel 
stops because, unlike automobiles, vessels do not travel according to a 
circumscribed path.36 The Court further noted that, as opposed to au-
tomobile license plates, observance of a vessel's outward markings by 
customs officers would not reveal whether a vessel was in compliance 
with documentation laws.37 The Villamonte-Marquez Court concluded 
that boarding a vessel, therefore, was necessary to effectively adminis-
ter the documentation laws.38 As a result, the Villamonte-Marquez 
27. See United States v. Cortez,· 449 U.S. 411 (1981); United States v. Martinez-Fu-
erte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
28. 422 u.s. 873 (1975). 
29. /d. at 876. 
30. /d. at 880-82. 
31.. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557-58 (1976). 
32. /d. at 557-58. 
33. /d. at 558-59. The Martinez-Fuerte Court noted that the motorist is not surprised 
by a fixed checkpoint because he knows, or may obtain knowledge of, the location 
of the checkpoints. /d. at 559; cf. Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903 (1984) 
(fixed sobriety checkpoints held constitutional under federal and state law). 
34. 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983). 
35. /d. at 2575. For a discussion of how the various circuits have ruled on this issue, 
see Comment, The Fourth Amendment: Rusting on the High Seas, 34 MERCER L. 
REv. 1537, 1539-60 (1983) (written prior to the Vi//amonte-Marquez holding and 
noting that Vi//amonte-Marquez will provide the Supreme Court with a chance to 
address this issue for the first time. /d. at 1563 n.l93); Comment, At Sea with the 
Fourth Amendment, 32 U. MIAMI L. REv. 51, 93-99 (1977). 
36. 103 S. Ct. at 2580. 
37. /d. 
38. /d. at 2582. 
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Court held that the fourth amendment's protection against unreasona-
ble search and seizure was not violated when customs officers, lacking 
articulable suspicion of a violation of law, boarded a vessel to inspect 
the vessel's registration documents. 39 
The Court's holding in Villamonte-Marquez failed to consider the 
individual's expectation of privacy while on board his vessel. The 
Court contrasted the boarding of a vessel with the stopping of an auto-
mobile,40 but neglected to compare the boarding of a private vessel 
with the entrance into a private residence.41 Since a boat often serves 
as a dwelling or temporary residence, an individual's expectation of 
privacy while on board his vessel could reasonably equal a home-
owner's expectation of privacy while in his home. The Villamonte-
Marquez Court, however, discounted the reasonableness of this expec-
tation by concluding that the government's need to enforce vessel docu-
mentation laws outweighed any fourth amendment interest that 
individuals have on board a vessel.42 Owners of private vessels, how-
ever, have a significant expectation of privacy while on board their ves-
sels because such vessels often serve as a temporary residence. 
The majority's rejection of the use of fixed checkpoints in water-
ways as impractical was criticized by the dissent in Villamonte-Mar-
quez. As noted by the dissent, a fixed checkpoint was feasible because 
the boarding occurred in a separate channel through which all vessels 
moving to and from the open sea must traverse.43 The Supreme Court 
has often required that law enforcement officers use the least instrusive 
means of accomplishing law objectives.44 This policy would favor the 
use of fixed checkpoints, in that they have been recognized to be less 
intrusive than random stops.45 
Furthermore, the boarding of the respondents' vessel cannot be 
justified as an investigatory stop to conduct a document inspection pur-
suant to section 1581(a). Section 1581(a) provides that "[a]ny officer of 
the customs may ... go on board of any vessel" to conduct a docu-
ment inspection.46 In Villamonte-Marquez, however, a customs officer 
39. /d. 
40. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. 
41. 103 S. Ct. at 2575-82. The defendants were on board a private vessel- a sailboat 
- and not a commercial vessel. 
42. /d. at 2581. The Court stated that the government's necessity in conducting ran-
dom and suspicionless vessel stops is to promote safe waterways and to deter 
smugglers. /d. 
43. /d. at 2589 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
44. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 650 (1979) (holding that police may 
not randomly stop vehicles to check their registration, but a checkpoint scheme 
would be constitutional due to the limited nature of the intrusion); United States 
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557-60 (1976) (permitting fixed checkpoints 
near the border as a less intrusive alternative than roving patrols). 
45. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 
428 u.s. 543, 545 (1976). 
46. See supra note 7 for the statutory provision. 
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and a police narcotics investigator boarded the respondents' vessel.47 
First, the statute contains no provisions authorizing police officers to 
board a vessel either to conduct a document inspection or for any other 
reason.48 Second, the two officers were not in fact conducting a docu-
ment inspection, but were working together as part of a patrol that had 
been formed in response to a tip that there was drug smuggling activity 
in the area.49 Thus, these two officers improperly relied upon section 
158l(a) as a means to further their ongoing criminal investigation, 
rather than to conduct a document inspection. 
The majority failed to give adequate consideration to alternatives 
to random vessel hoardings. The Court reasoned that it was necessary 
to board vessels because their exterior markings do not provide suffi-
cient evidence of compliance with registration laws.50 An improved 
system of exterior markings, as suggested by the dissent, would obviate 
the need to board vessels and would thus require no personal intru-
sion.51 Other alternatives to random vessel hoardings include periodic 
mandatory dockside inspections and inspections conducted at sea, 
based on a neutral selection process. 52 
The distinctions between vessels and automobiles do not justify a 
rule that permits random vessel stops for document inspection to be 
conducted without any suspicion of wrongdoing. The holding in Vi/-
/amonte-Marquez allows vessel hoardings for document inspection to 
serve as a pretext for contraband searches. To prevent this effect53 and 
to protect the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy while on 
47. Brief for Respondent at 10, United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573 
(1983). Reference is made to the brief as the Court's opinion failed to state that 
the police officer, who boarded the vessel, was a narcotics investigator. 
48. See supra note 7 for the text of§ 158l(a). 
49. See Brief for Respondent at 9, United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 
2573 (1983); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 652 F.2d 478, 487 (1981), 
rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983). 
50. Vil/amonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580 (1983). 
51. Id. at 2590 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent argues that improved exterior 
markings and the use of ship-to-shore radios would be less intrusive alternatives 
to vessel hoardings. 
52. For a complete discussion of alternatives to random vessel hoardings, see Com-
ment, Fourth Amendment: Rusting on the High Seas, 34 MERCER L. REv. 1537, 
1561-63 (1983); Comment, High on the Seas: Drug Smuggling, the Fourth Amend-
ment and Warrantless Searches at Sea, 93 HARv. L. REv. 725, 740-50 (1980). 
53. The scope of the Maryland marine police officers' statutory authority (State Boat 
Act, MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN.§§ 8-701 to -739 (1983 & Supp. 1984)) is similar 
to that granted customs officers under section 158l(a). The relevant language of 
the State [Maryland] Boat Act is essentially identical to section 158l(a). See id. at 
§ 8-727. Nevertheless, the state statute has been construed to mean that Maryland 
marine police officers may not stop and board a vessel without at least a reason-
able suspicion of illegal activity. See Blair v. United States, 665 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 
1981). Since Villamonte-Marquez did not require customs officers to have a rea-
sonable suspicion of illegal activity while acting pursuant to section 158l(a), the 
probable effect in Maryland is that state marine police officers may no longer be 
required to have a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity when acting pursuant to 
section 8-727 of the Maryland boat act. Maryland, however, is free to afford an 
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board his vessel, random vessel stops should not be permitted in the 
absence of an articulable suspicion of wrongdoing. 
Richard Lloyd Mlller 
individual greater constitutional protection than that provided by federal law. 
See Mo. CoNST. art. 5 (Md. Decl. of Rights, 1981). 
